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SUMMARY 
With so many trouble spots in the world, it can be difficult for Canadian businesses 
to know where to trade successfully and with some assurance of security. Canadian 
government organizations affiliated with Global Affairs Canada (GAC) need to take 
a broader view of international security, rather than assessing states in isolation, if 
businesses are to have the vital information they need.
Multinational firms typically have their own risk-management strategies, but smaller 
enterprises need outside help to get information on the safety and viability of 
potential export markets.
However, none of these GAC-affiliated organizations examines the security risks 
inherent in the interactions between countries. While GAC focuses mainly on 
economics, tariffs, language barriers and other factors, the Crown corporation 
Export Development Canada (EDC) does risk assessments of various countries to 
determine what level of political risk insurance it should offer to Canadian companies. 
The Business Development Bank, best known for its domestic work with Canadian 
businesses, has branched out into the foreign realm too, but only in terms of industry 
and market research on export assessments.
Based on long-term GDP projections, some interesting forecasts have been made 
that will affect how and where Canadian businesses trade internationally. They will 
need accurate information on risk and security in order to do so. By 2030, the four 
largest world economies will be those of the U.S., China, India and Japan. For now, 
the best bets for Canadian businesses in the short to medium term include China, 
India and some Southeast Asian countries, although there are some accompanying 
dangers in these areas. Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt have the potential to be good 
markets for Canadian exports, but the current risk from terrorist activity precludes 
foreign commercial interests.
The unstable relationships between countries in the world’s hotspots need continuing 
assessment and watchfulness. For example, having modernized its navy, China is 
flexing its military muscles in the South China Sea, building artificial islands there 
and bullying the Philippines and Vietnam over their competing claims in the region. 
If the United States were drawn into a larger conflict there, Canadian business interests would 
be severely compromised.
The perennial tensions between the two nuclear powers Pakistan and India pose a threat to 
commercial activities in that part of the globe, along with terrorist activity within Pakistan 
and neighbouring Afghanistan. The terrorism risk is also high domestically in the Philippines, 
while Canada’s NAFTA partner, Mexico, can be a dangerous place to do business, due to 
organized crime. And while sub-Saharan Africa would appear to offer great potential for 
trade, those opportunities must be weighed against the spread of Islamic State supporters, 
other terrorists and corrupt regimes throughout that continent.
Canada cannot even count on stability among its traditional trading partners, with Eastern 
Europe keeping a wary eye on Russia’s moves and Japan under threat from missiles launched 
by the volatile North Korean regime.
What all this means is that the Canadian organizations doing business assessments must 
expand their scope. So far, they have limited themselves to looking at individual states and 
providing information about what is going on inside those states’ borders. However, countries 
do not exist in bubbles. Canadian entrepreneurs need the bigger picture of risk assessment as 
seen through a broader international lens. When they understand fully the security dimensions 
of global commerce, they will be in a much better position to make the right decisions about 
their business ventures.
1Just as trade is the lifeblood of our economy, security is essential for trade. Successive Canadian 
governments have encouraged entrepreneurs and firms — especially small and medium-sized 
enterprises — to expand their markets for goods and services, seeking new export markets. Firms 
compete aggressively and exporters may not face a level playing field when attempting to secure 
customers abroad. Some areas of the globe are highly unstable; while larger multinational firms 
have robust risk management strategies, others struggle to operate at the nexus of trade, commerce 
and security. In this environment, it is important to examine the intersection of today’s global 
security threats and Canada’s emerging trade policy.
The idea that the international security environment affects international trade is both an accepted 
and abstract statement. What does it mean in concrete, physical and geographic terms, when we 
talk about the security dimension of global commerce? One of way of examining this question 
is to identify areas of the world where trade opportunities are likely to increase or decrease over 
the coming decades, and then to discuss the international security environment in those places 
that present Canada with the greatest opportunity. Mapping countries and regions of the world 
according to opportunity and international security risk, as a means of giving a global snapshot 
of the nexus of conflict and trade, reveals both expected outcomes and surprises. In the short 
to medium term, Canada should pursue opportunities in China, India and certain countries of 
Southeast Asia. In the longer term, it will want to consider untapped and growing markets in places 
like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Egypt.
EXISTING APPROACHES TO IDENTIFYING MARKETS
Global Affairs Canada puts significant effort into determining where Canadian business should 
pursue new markets. Its Global Markets Action Plan, launched in 2013, involves a number 
of detailed steps in a multi-stage process to identify high growth areas, regions of potential 
opportunity, and ultimately places where Canadian companies should seek new business (Global 
Affairs Canada, 2017). The analysis is comprehensive and involves not just economic capacity but 
also things like tariff and non-tariff barriers, including language barriers. Global Affairs’ Trade 
Commissioner Service (TCS), a network of trade professionals working in embassies and high 
commissions around the world, gives Canadian firms specific and practical advice on how to do 
business in a particular country. In future, Global Affairs may include an overlay of international 
security risks to give a still more complete picture, but it does not do so now (Downs, 2017).
Export Development Canada (EDC), a Crown corporation that serves in essence as the banking 
arm of Global Affairs, conducts a political risk assessment of countries around the world to 
determine the level of political risk insurance it should offer Canadian businesses in support of 
their overseas investments. In doing so, it focuses almost exclusively on factors within the “black 
box” of a state. Political risk is determined mainly by looking at internal factors such as regime 
type, violent acts within the host country, socio-economic grievances, etc., (Baas, 2010a). To the 
extent external inter-state dynamics are accounted for, it is in the realm of “bad neighbourhoods” 
where conflict in one state spills over into the host country (Baas, 2010b,153). 
Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), a second Crown corporation, adopts the same general 
approach as EDC, but where EDC supports exporters doing business with foreign companies, CCC 
supports those seeking foreign government opportunities (such as building a government airport). 
Finally, while a third Crown corporation, the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), 
has historically sought to help Canadian business grow in the domestic market, it now offers an 
international market selection consulting service. BDC’s five-step process for identifying foreign 
markets for Canadian business, too, is “black box” in orientation, focusing on industry and market 
research (BDC, 2017).
2INCORPORATING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMPONENT
Economic opportunity
This paper adopts an admittedly broad brush and crudely determined economic approach, yet it 
also makes a preliminary attempt to incorporate the international security component. It bases 
economic opportunities on long-term GDP projections from two large-scale reports as an indicator 
of where market opportunities may be going — or where they may be leaving. One report is from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2016). The report covers almost all countries of the world and 
looks at projected growth in GDP by 2030. It finds that by then the United States will remain the 
largest economy in the world, followed closely by China. India will be in third place, some ways 
back, and Japan a close fourth. The rest of the G8 will also be in this top 20, as well as Brazil, 
Mexico, Indonesia and Nigeria, among others (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
 
What is equally if not more interesting is the degree to which countries are growing or stagnating. 
If we look at the projected cumulative growth rate of 180 countries over 15 years we find the most 
vibrant economies, those that are in the top 20, are in South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan); 
China; and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam). The more stagnant economies are in 
Europe, including all European members of the G8 (Italy, Germany, France, Russia). The U.K., 
Canada and the U.S. are not far behind, though, as is the case with the remaining BRIC — Brazil. 
By this measure, Japan is the second most stagnant country in the world after Venezuela (see 
Figure 2).
3FIGURE 2 HIGHEST AND LOWEST GDP GROWTH RATES TO 2030
Selected economies in the top 20
(highest first)
Selected economies in the bottom 20
(lowest first)
India Venezuela
Cambodia Japan
Bangladesh Italy
Vietnam Portugal
Sri Lanka Germany
Pakistan France
China Belgium
Indonesia Russia
Philippines Denmark
Malaysia Austria
(U.S., U.K., Canada, Spain and Brazil are in the bottom 50)
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Agriculture Report, June 2016: https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/
international-macroeconomic-data-set.aspx
A second report is by PricewaterhouseCoopers. Released in February 2017, it focuses on the 32 
largest economies in the world in terms of GDP, at purchasing power parity, and makes long-
term projections to 2050. The report finds that the largest economy will be China, followed by 
India, the United States and Indonesia. Egypt and Pakistan join the list in 2030, and Vietnam and 
the Philippines in 2050, while Canada, Italy and Spain drop off in 2050 (see Figure 3). In short, 
this longer-term report confirms the findings of the Department of Agriculture report: that trade 
opportunities are moving in the direction of China, Southeast Asia and South Asia.
FIGURE 3 TOP 20 COUNTRIES IN GDP AT PURCHASING POWER PARITY
2016 2030 2050
1 China China China 
2 United States United States India 
3 India India United States 
4 Japan Japan Indonesia 
5 Germany Indonesia Brazil 
6 Russia Russia Russia 
7 Brazil Germany Mexico 
8 Indonesia Brazil Japan 
9 U.K. Mexico Germany 
10 France U.K. U.K.
11 Mexico France Turkey 
12 Italy Turkey France 
13 South Korea Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia 
14 Turkey South Korea Nigeria 
15 Saudi Arabia Italy Egypt 
16 Spain Iran Pakistan 
17 Canada Spain Iran 
18 Iran Canada South Korea 
19 Australia Egypt Philippines 
20 Thailand Pakistan Vietnam
(New to the list in yellow) 
Gone from list: Australia Canada
Thailand Italy
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Long View: How Will the Global Economic Order Change by 2050?  
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050/assets/pwc-the-world-in-2050-full-report-feb-2017.pdf
4Security trends in selected regions
Overlaying international security considerations on areas of identified growth gives a more 
complete picture of where Canadian businesses should focus their efforts.
China and Southeast Asia. When it comes to trade with China and Southeast Asia, by far the most 
important security concern is growing tension in the South China Sea. China is a rising regional 
power in political and military terms and it wants to control what is going on in its neighbourhood. 
It has dramatically modernized its navy, including new ships, submarines and its first aircraft 
carrier. The submarines, along with a new shore-based, long-range, precision anti-ship ballistic 
missile, are well suited to preventing U.S. carrier groups from approaching Southeast Asian waters. 
America characterizes this as an “anti-access” strategy on the part of China, designed to keep U.S. 
naval forces outside the first island chain and possibly as far back as the second island chain (see 
Figure 4).
FIGURE 4
 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), 18.
China seeks to secure its economic rise and for this, it is dependent on open sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Middle East 
and Africa. It has recently broadened its military perspective from a doctrine of coastal defence to 
one of open seas protection U.S. Naval Institute, 2015), and it is pursuing military capabilities like 
aircraft carriers, frigates and destroyers that are well suited to the SLOC mission. Most troubling 
is that this military buildup is being done while at the same time engaging in bullying behaviour in 
the region, and demonstrating a lack of regard for international law. China has confronted smaller 
countries, like Vietnam and the Philippines, over competing claims in the South China Sea, and it 
is building artificial islands deemed illegal by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. 
5China has built military installations on the islands, a further indication of the region’s overall 
militarization (Holmes, 2017).
The United States has responded to Chinese actions by pursuing military capabilities and strategies 
designed to counter China’s, and by conducting freedom-of-navigation operations in the South 
China Sea. Intelligence agencies assess that regional tension will continue to increase as countries 
pursue competing claims in the area (Clapper, 2016a, 16). The commander of the U.S. Pacific 
Command has stated pointedly that the U.S. “will not allow shared domains to be closed down 
unilaterally” (Panda, 2016). Although we hear a lot about peer competition directly between the 
U.S. and China, for some the greater risk is that a smaller conflict in the region will escalate to U.S. 
involvement (Goldstein, 2013). Conflict that spills over into war would directly affect Canada’s 
future commercial opportunities in this region.
South Asia. Some of the biggest economic opportunities of the future could lie in South Asia. India 
is especially important in commercial terms and, according to the reports cited here, there is likely 
to be significant growth in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Yet, there is a multitude of security concerns 
in the region. The maritime-based geopolitical competition of Southeast Asia is extending into 
the Indian Ocean. The Chinese navy operates a growing number of ships and submarines in the 
Indian Ocean, and it has established a footprint in several ports rimming the Indian Ocean, as well 
as one in Pakistan. Some observers refer to this latter development as a “string of pearls” strategy 
for increasing China’s regional influence (Baker, 2015). For India, there is a perceived Chinese 
aggressiveness in the Indian Ocean (Clapper, 2015a, 22), to the degree that China’s activities have 
prompted India and the U.S. to share intelligence information on submarine movements (Singh, 2017).
Of still greater concern in the region is the historic and ongoing tension between India and Pakistan 
(CSIS, 2016, 5), both nuclear powers, and especially the security situation within Pakistan. India 
views Pakistan as a direct terrorism threat and a source of regional instability (Clapper, 2015b, 
21). Pakistan struggles domestically with violent Islamist militants. Moreover, it has recently 
added small and highly transportable tactical nuclear weapons to its arsenal as a hedge against 
Indian conventional military superiority. Because smaller, short-range weapons are easier to steal, 
a major U.S. and Western concern is that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of radicals 
(Brunnstrom, 2015). Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s internal politics are such that U.S. intelligence 
expects transnational terrorist groups will expand their presence in the country (Clapper, 2016b, 
27). Ongoing if not increasing instability in the South Asian region will hinder Canadian business’s 
ability to take full advantage of potential commercial opportunities.
MAPPING COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
This brief discussion has focused on the security environment in China, Southeast Asia and South 
Asia because, based on projected GDP growth over the coming decades, these regions may present 
Canadian business with the greatest economic opportunity. A detailed analysis could look more 
closely at these regions as well as assess other regions of the world, providing an overall picture of 
the global nexus of opportunity and risk. Figure 5 below gives just one possible outcome of such an 
assessment, overlaying “degree of security risk” onto “level of future economic opportunity”.
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According to this matrix, China and India present the strongest future opportunity for Canadian 
business (Gov’t. of Canada Travel Advice, 2017). These countries are located at a medium security 
risk because, while they have basic control over what happens within their national borders, they 
face the security concerns outlined above. Parts of India belong on the high-risk side of the line, 
as one moves northwest and northeast to the Pakistani and Myanmar borders respectively, due to 
terrorist activity and insurgency that cross borders into India. On the Pakistani side, developments 
are also linked to the ongoing instability in Afghanistan.
Brazil also falls in the top left block, but at a lower level of opportunity because of its projected 
slow GDP growth. Southeast Asian countries like Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines are well 
above the line in terms of opportunity, but they straddle the line of security risk. There are internal 
risks such as terrorism in the Philippines to consider, along with regional concerns brought on by 
Chinese behaviour. Mexico has significant potential but is very dangerous in some areas, especially 
the north and west, due to high levels of violence linked to organized crime. 
Egypt and Nigeria have strong potential but are, and will continue to be, dangerous places to 
operate. Egypt faces a persistent threat of terrorist and militant activity both in the Sinai and in 
mainland Egypt, while Nigeria struggles with internal threats from groups that have pledged 
allegiance to Islamic State (Clapper, 2016c, 25, 28). Growth rate trends suggest that many countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa will be promising trading partners of the future and therefore Africa 
approaches the middle line on the matrix. Yet, much of the continent is racked by failed states and 
terrorist activity that is unlikely to end or be resolved any time soon. The Middle East presents 
relatively limited economic opportunity (the region would benefit from individual analysis of 
various countries) and is the site of longstanding, intractable international conflicts. Broadly 
speaking, market risk in Africa must be seen in light of the progressive spread of Islamic State, a 
7byproduct of the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent American departure 
(Jones et al., 2017) from Iraq to Syria to the African continent, including the Sinai, Libya and 
beyond. The 2011 intervention in Libya was a significant facilitating factor. 
Economic and security trends suggest that Canada’s traditional trading partners in Europe and 
Japan will be relatively stagnant but secure places to operate. Yet, a safe security environment 
cannot be taken for granted: Eastern Europe faces the threat of a Russian bear that in the past 
decade has waged war in Georgia and Ukraine, while Japan contends with repeated missile 
launches from the unstable regime in North Korea. Russia is projected to have low GDP growth 
over the coming decades, in part because of its declining population, and is a dangerous place to 
do business in various pockets around the country. It has staked much of its growth on the opening 
waters of the northern sea route, but sees China as a major competitor for access to the promising 
sea lanes (Blank, 2015).
Where countries and regions should fall on this matrix is open to debate and to a detailed, 
comprehensive and rigorous analysis. The purpose here is simply to find a way to think in general 
terms about the intersection of international conflict and trade.
CONCLUSION
Global Affairs Canada does extensive analyses of regions of the world to provide advice to 
Canadian businesses on where they can best pursue economic opportunities. EDC and its cousin, 
CCC, examine an extensive list of factors to determine political risk in foreign markets. However, 
to date, assessments by Global Affairs/ITC, EDC, CCC and BDC have focused primarily on the 
black box of a state and have not explicitly included an international security component that takes 
as its starting point state-to-state relations. We may know the market conditions inside China’s 
and India’s borders, but have we accounted for the impact on regional markets of growing great 
power competition among the United States, China and India? We may think that Europe is a stable 
place to do business, but what is the likelihood Russia will send forces into the Baltics and present 
NATO with a fait accompli? Examining countries and regions of economic interest through an 
international security lens would provide an important window on the new security dimension of 
global commerce, further assisting Canadian business in harnessing future opportunities.
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